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Introduction
Generally speaking, the available ancient sources provide us with very little clue as to 
exactly what motivated individual Roman emperors to annex fresh territories and make 
them a part of Rome’s imperium. Thus the question as to why a particular region was 
appropriated by one of other emperor is more often than not a matter of speculation 
on the part of modern scholars, relying as they have to on individual interpretation of a 
somewhat limited ‘data-set’ rather than a concise series of clear-cut ‘facts’. This is not, or 
so it might seem at first sight, the case with the annexation of Lycia by Claudius in AD 
43. The two ancient sources on the matter directly report that a state of ‘discord’ or ‘civic 
unrest’ motivated the decision to take control of a territory that had long been a compliant 
client state and firm ally of Rome1. 
Absolute belief in this ‘fact’ has a long history2, and is also the basic conclusion of 
the most recent discussion of the annexation of Lycia, as provided by Sencer Şahin 
and Mustafa Adak in their magisterial Stadiasmus Patarensis3. Indeed, these authors 
begin their analysis of the matter with the terse heading ‘Politische Instabilität auf der 
lykischen Halbinsel als wesentliches Motiv der Annexation’4. True, they do make a series 
of cursory remarks on other motives advanced by earlier scholars in connection with 
the annexation of the territory - the craving on the part of Claudius for ‘imperial glory’, 
best achieved through territorial expansion5; a desire on his part to extend his personal 
patronage;6 and perhaps even ‘fiscal advantages’7. Yet Şahin and Adak peremptorily 
dismiss these alternative (or parallel?) motives with the conclusion that ‘Nach der 
kaiserlichen Sichtweise konnte die Annexion Lykiens nicht länger hinsausgezögert 
werden, weil seine Bewohner in einem endlosen Bürgerkrieg verwickelt waren, den sie 
aus einiger Kraft nicht beenden konnten’8. In other words, the annexation of Lycia was 
* Dr. Julian Bennett, Bilkent Üniversitesi, İnsani Bilimler ve Edebiyat Fakültesi, Arkeoloji Bölümü, 06800 Bilkent, 
Ankara. E-mail: bennett@bilkent.edu.tr
1  Suet. Claud. 25.3; and Dio 60.17.3-4.
2 Cf. Magie 1950, 529; Syme 1995, 270. 
3 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49-62.
4 ‘Political instability in the Lycian peninsula as the substantive motive for the annexation’: Şahin – Adak 2007, 49.
5 Magie 1950, 529.
6 Jameson 1973, 278.
7 Syme 1995, 271.
8 ‘From the imperial viewpoint, the annexation of Lycia could no longer be put off because its inhabitants were in-
volved in an endless civil war that they could not end in their own manner’: Şahin – Adak 2007, 79. 
ADALYA XIV, 2011
120 Julian Bennett
forced on Rome by the necessity to maintain stability in the only part of Anatolia that 
was not under direct Roman control.
Şahin and Adak’s all too-easy conjecture that it was indeed internal strife alone that 
prompted the annexation of Lycia, and their somewhat curt and certainly emphatic 
exclusion of any other motives that may have played a part, demands a response: 
otherwise their thesis risks becoming the orthodoxy. In other words, what we need to 
consider is that although an extreme political situation may have persuaded Rome to 
intervene into the affairs of Lycia, it does not elucidate why the territory was then formally 
provincialised. This writer believes that a better understanding of what brought about this 
course of action can best be found through an analysis of Şahin and Adak’s verdict along 
with a consideration of those alternative motives already mentioned9. 
To resolve a dangerous level of political instability? 
Let us first consider the evidence for Şahin and Adak’s assertion that Claudius annexed 
Lycia essentially because of a high level of political strife in the region10. As it is, the only 
ancient commentaries that survive regarding the event certainly indicate that a degree 
of ‘discord’ in Lycia prompted the process. According to Suetonius, writing some 60-70 
years after the event, ‘Lycias ob exitiabiles inter se discordias libertatem ademit ’ - ‘The 
Lycians lost their liberty because of their destructive internal conflicts’11. Dio, writing a 
further 100 or so years later, not only dates the event to 43, but elaborates to an extent 
on Suetonius’ bland statement, reporting that Claudius ‘reduced the Lycians to servitude 
because of social unrest (‘στάσις’) among them and the slaughter of some Romans: 
and [he then] incorporated them [the Lycians] in the prefecture of Pamphylia’: Dio then 
goes on to indicate that around the time of the annexation, Claudius received a Lycian 
embassy, presumably sent either to explain current events in the territory, or to plead for a 
return to the status quo ante12. To which we might add that Dio’s History is an essentially 
chronologically driven work, and he indicates that the annexation of Lycia took place 
before the invasion of Britain, an event that has to be associated with the month of May or 
June 4313. 
On the face of it, then, our two ancient sources - although both written post eventum - 
concur in that a state of instability motivated the annexation of Lycia. Indeed, the reports 
of a degree of ‘discordia’ or ‘στάσις’ if not actual revolt in Lycia at the time are borne out 
by several epigraphic sources. To begin with we have the statement in the primary text 
  9 It should be stressed at the outset that a quibble with this specific issue of Şahin – Adak 2007 should not be 
viewed as belittling the main body of that text, a major contribution to our understanding of the early history of 
Roman Lycia.
10 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49 and 79.
11 Suet. Claud. 25.3.
12 Dio 60.17.3 (Dio’s observation that Lycia was then formed into a province with Pamphylia is now known to be 
incorrect: cf. Şahin – Adak 2007, 84-92). Dio also notes (60.17.4) that Claudius summarily deprived one of the 
Lycian ambassadors of his Roman citizenship as he failed to understand a question put to him in Latin (cf. Suet. 
Claud. 16.2, presumably the same man): Levick 1989, 114-16, has suggested that the ambassador did not so much 
have a difficulty with Latin but with Claudius’ indistinct and slurred manner of speech. Note also that two of the 
ambassadors may be commemorated on inscriptions from Lycia: Şahin - Adak 2007, 52.
13 Dio’s account of Lycia’s annexation at 60.17.3 is followed by a discussion on events in Rome, after which comes 
his account of the invasion of Britain at 60.19.1, an episode dated to May or June: cf. Levick 1990, 141, with n. 15.
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on the Stadiasmus Patarensis itself14, a monument precisely dated in its opening lines to 
46 as it associates Claudius with his fifth year of holding the tribunicia potestas and his 
forthcoming fourth consulate15. The text continues by describing Claudius as ‘the saviour 
of the (Lycian) nation’, and after stressing the loyalty and allied status of the Lycians, it 
notes how they were ‘freed from [internal] faction, lawlessness and brigandage’, thanks 
to the foresight of the emperor. It then specifies how the emperor has restored ‘concord, 
the fair administration of justice, and the ancestral laws’ to Lycia, and how the system of 
local administration has been modified so that the ‘incompetent majority’ are now ruled 
by councillors chosen from ‘among the superior people’16. It concludes by noting that 
the ‘Lycians’ had dedicated the monument to Claudius ‘in return for the many benefits 
they received from him through [the agency of] Quintus Veranius’, signalled here as 
πρεσβευτής καί άντιστράτηγος, the Greek equivalent for legatus pro praetore and so the 
serving governor of Lycia17. 
As it is, Veranius’ incomplete but essentially restorable cursus honorum, as supplied 
on the surviving lower right hand half of the funerary monument erected at Pratolungo 
for one of his daughters, also and quite explicitly confirms that a state of chaos in Lycia 
occasioned Rome’s intervention into Lycian affairs18. The surviving part of the text can be 
restored as beginning with a reference to Veranius’ appointment to a five year term there, 
and goes on to note that after destroying a fortress of the ‘[T]racheotae’ and restoring the 
defences of a city whose name is now lost (but which is likely to be Cibyra19), Veranius 
‘pacified’ the region20. The inscription also implies that his successes in Lycia brought 
Veranius the exceptional honour of the ordinary consulship, which he took in 49, (suffect 
consulships being the more usual award for military success), along with appointment as 
an augur, and elevation to patrician rank21. 
Apart from the reports of Suetonius and Dio, these two epigraphic texts stand as our 
best evidence that there was a degree of ‘discord’ in Lycia before and at around the time 
of its annexation. But they do not stand alone, for there are others that also testify to a 
state of unrest if not actual anarchy there in the late 30’s and early 40’s AD22. We need 
only note here the Bonda Tepesi altar, dated to 45, with its expansive assertions of Lycian 
14 Şahin – Adak 2007, 28-35, summarised at 35. 
15 Cf. Kienast, 1990, 91.
16 On the restoration of the ‘ancestral laws’, see now Kantor [n.d].
17 Mason 1974, 153.
18 CIL 6.41075. Several restorations have been offered of this text since it was first reported in Gordon 1952, the 
most recent being Birley 2005, 37, and Şahin - Adak 2007, 63-64, these differing in few details - except that 
Şahin – Adak refrain from attempting a detailed reconstruction of the missing left hand part of the text.
19 Şahin – Adak 2007, 60-61; also Syme 1995, 273, stressing the strategic location of Cibyra in regional 
communications and its established status as a centre for Roman and Italian traders in the region. 
20 The surviving text specifies that Veranius ‘pacified’ something, but exactly what he pacified was specified on 
the missing part. There is little to choose between the alternative restorations offered for the relevant part, i.e., [a 
rebellibus complevit cietas obsidone acer]b[a] pacavit (Gordon 1952, 170); ‘[perfecit discordiis provinciae placatis 
ur]b[es] pacavit (AE 1953.251); [huius civitatis complevit et regionis oppi]d[a] pacavit’(CIL 6.41075); or ‘[totam 
provinciam a latroni]b[us] pacavit’ (Syme 1995, 273): but however it is to be restored, the general sense is clear, 
that Veranius brought peace to Lycia or one of its regions.
21 For Q. Veranius’ four-month ordinary consulship in 49, see now Tortoriello 2004, 422-23 and 585-88.
22 Şahin – Adak 2007, 56-62. 
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loyalty to Claudius, and specifically honouring him for bringing peace to the region;23 
and an inscription from Corinth set up by Lycian koinon to thank a Lycian woman, Junia 
Theodora, for giving shelter to some exiled Lycians during a period that can be dated im-
mediately prior to the annexation24. 
Unfortunately, the exact cause and nature of the unrest in Lycia in the years leading 
up to the annexation are not specifically explained in any of the surviving texts, literary 
or epigraphic. Except, that is, that the references in the Stadiasmus Patarensis to a res-
toration of concord, fair administration of justice and the ancestral laws, along with the 
re-establishment of local government, all suggest a high degree of factional infighting that 
probably involved some level of violence - and perhaps, even, the quasi-judicial execution 
of Roman citizens25. Clearly, however, this state of ‘discord’ was of an essentially political 
nature, as Şahin and Adak argue, citing, inter alia, inscriptions from Arneai and Cibyra to 
support their premise26. On the other hand, Veranius’ cursus honorum signifies that the 
situation was further exacerbated by the activities of ‘bandits’ and others apparently in the 
mountainous regions in the north of the territory, although as C. Kokkinia reminds us, 
these ‘bandits’ might in truth be the political opponents of those oligarchs who controlled 
Lycia27. 
Either way, the situation in Lycia was certainly serious enough to require Roman inter-
vention to resolve matters: but was it serious enough to justify on its own the annexation 
of the territory? The point being that aside from the other motives alluded to above that 
may have played their part in prompting the decision to provincialise Lycia, there are good 
reasons for doubting that events there were of such a critical nature to warrant on their 
own depriving the Lycians of their freedom and their long held status as a territory regis-
tered as populi Romani amicus et socius - ‘friend and ally of the Roman people’28. 
We should first consider the fact that if Lycia did indeed face a state of ‘endless civil 
war’29, then Veranius was hardly the most appropriate choice to deal with this. The only 
military service he could have seen at the time of the annexation was his term sometime 
in the 30’s as a legionary tribune with the legio IV Scythica in Moesia, a position he held 
during the course of a normal senatorial career30. And although Claudius did need skilled 
generals for his imminent invasion of Britain the same year, we can be sure that if the situ-
ation in Lycia really desired it, then there were sufficient men with more military experi-
ence who could have been assigned to the command31. True, as Şahin and Adak and oth-
ers have observed, Veranius was clearly one of Claudius’ favourites: but at this stage in his 
career, immediately after his praetorship, his qualifications were those of an administrator, 
23 Marksteiner – Wörrle 2002, 555-56.
24 Robert 1969, 840-58, esp. 847-48; an attempt by Behrwald 2000, 120-28 to date this inscription to the time of 
Brutus has been rejected: cf. Jones 2001, 167 n. 22, with Marksteiner – Wörrle 2002, 559 n. 45.
25 Kantor [n.d.], 16.
26 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49-62.
27 Kokkinia 2004, 45-49.
28 Cf. Şahin – Adak 2007, 49-51, for Lycia’s long-standing relationship with Rome. 
29 Şahin – Adak 2007, 79.
30 Birley 2005, 39.
31 Cn. Domitius Corbulo, suffect consul in AD 39 (?), made commander of the Upper Rhine legions in 47, and Q. 
Curtius Rufus, suffect consul in AD 43, and Corbulo’s successor on the Upper Rhine, spring to mind.
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not of a military commander32. And we must not forget that supervising an efficient bu-
reaucracy was a major responsibility in the formalising and governing of a province at 
all times. Interestingly enough, it so happens that one of the few inscriptions attesting to 
Veranius’ service in Lycia is a copy of a letter he wrote addressing administrative issues at 
Tlos, but which was evidently distributed to other places in the region, and which attests 
to the close attention he paid to local administrative matters33.
We should also note that if Lycia was in a state of ‘endless civil war’ that needed a 
forceful resolution then it is surprising that there is no epigraphic or other evidence for a 
single Roman military unit ever having served in Lycia proper in the Julio-Claudian period 
- or, for that matter, at any other time during the later principate. The point being that if 
the political and social situation in Lycia was such that it required annexation to bring or-
der to the region, then it logically follows that a garrison of some kind would have been 
needed to secure the new province, even if this was only required for policing duties in 
a ‘mopping-up’ phase after order had been re-established. After all, even the most peace-
ful of regions in Anatolia had a garrison of some kind: consider, for example, Bithynia, 
with its cohors VI Equitata registered there by both literary and epigraphic records34. True, 
the absence of any evidence for an auxiliary unit having been stationed in Lycia is not de 
facto evidence of absence. But even so, it does seem suspicious that while Lycia proper 
has produced well over 350 inscriptions dating to the principate, none of these relate to 
any auxiliary unit having been stationed there in that period35. Compare this state of af-
fairs with, for example, the province of Thrace, another territory annexed by Claudius (in 
44/45) after a period of civil unrest there. Of the 400 or so known inscriptions from that 
province, eight on stone and three bronze auxiliary diplomata refer to one or other of the 
auxiliary regiments regularly stationed there, the normal complement apparently being 
two cohortes. Admittedly, this number of 13 epigraphic references is a small proportion of 
the overall total of epigraphic texts from Thrace: but it does make the point that in regions 
where military units were stationed on a permanent basis then we might with good rea-
son expect to find this reflected in the epigraphic record. 
However, we must assume that Veranius had some military elements at his disposal: 
how else could he have restored order to the poleis of Lycia, never mind deal with the 
‘bandits’ in the mountains and - or so it would seem - a threatening situation at Cibyra? 
He may have relied on the existing civic militias of the Lycian poleis, but as they seem to 
have been unable to deal with the situation in Lycia before his arrival, then it seems likely 
that he was also supplied with a cadre or Roman troops, perhaps auxilia detached from 
Galatia and/or Asia, or even auxilia and possibly legionaries seconded from units outside 
32 Cf. Şahin – Adak 2007, 81. That Veranius went on to become governor of Britain in 57, with the specific duty 
of subduing the Silures, does not negate the claim that he had very little military experience: in Britain he had 
three battle-hardened legions with experienced legates at his disposal, the legates presumably directing military 
actions. That said, it is believed that the Veranius to whom Onasander dedicated his Strategikos is the same man 
(Birley 2005, 40-41), the implication being he was an experienced general as well as a student of war: but the 
treatise may well have been dedicated to congratulate Veranius on his appointment to Britain.
33 Wörrle 1975, 254-86 (= AE 1976.673). 
34 Pliny Ep. 10.106 and 107, with IGR 3.1396.
35 All of the Roman military-related texts from Lycia proper record stationarii or the like, that is, soldiers on 
detached duty from their parent unit, based at either Perge or Side in Pamphylia: cf. Bennett 2007, 143-48. 
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of Anatolia36. Yet, when all is said and done, there is nothing in the available evidence to 
suggest that Veranius was ever involved in serious or sustained military action in Lycia, 
even though some have speculated that the missing part of his cursus honorum may be 
restored as indicating that he won ornamenta triumphalia for his service there37. But even 
if this was the case we need to note that Claudius was notoriously profligate with the 
award: for example, ornamenta triumphalia were awarded to Cn.Domitius Corbulo for the 
canal he dug between the Rhine and the Meuse, and to his successor, Q. Curtius Rufus, 
for opening silver mines in Germania38. So, even if Veranius was honoured with the orna-
menta triumphalia, it could well have been for the road-building programme he directed 
in Lycia, as is commemorated on Face B of the Stadiasmus Patarensis and also on the 
Bonda Tepesi altar39.
Yet when all is said and done, there can be no doubt that, as Şahin - Adak have co-
gently argued, Roman intervention into Lycia affairs in 43 was prompted by a state of 
‘discord’ there. Likewise, Veranius evidently restored peace and freedom from this discord, 
which helps explain what might otherwise be seen as an ironic gesture by the Lycians: 
the issue, shortly after they essentially lost their independence, of coins with the personi-
fication of libertas - ‘liberty’ - on the reverse40. The reference is clearly to a restoration of 
liberty from the civil strife that had preceded the annexation41. Even so, as we have seen 
there are reasons for doubting that a state of ‘discordia’ amounting to an imminent or even 
an on-going ‘Bürgerkrieg’ in Lycia occasioned the intervention, and that such a state of af-
fairs was the single ‘essential’ or ‘substantive’ reason for its annexation42. Which perforce 
means that we need to consider what part other motives may have played in the process.
A need for Imperial glory? 
According to D. Magie, the annexation of Lycia was ‘in accord with Claudius’ desire 
for the glory of extending the Empire which [then] led to the annexation of Mauretania 
[formalised in 42/43], Britannia [43], Thrace [44/45] and Judaea [44]; he goes on to observe 
the ‘specious grounds’ for the seizure of Lycia, ‘that no other means could be found for 
preventing the Lycians from quarrelling with one another’, and adds the ‘further pretext … 
that Roman citizens had wrongfully been put to death’43. Now, it cannot be denied that 
Claudius greatly enlarged the number of territories directly controlled by Rome: in addi-
tion to those just mentioned, he also annexed the client states of Noricum (in 46) and the 
Alpes Graiae et Poeninae (sometime before 47); and transformed Rhodes from a free to a 
36 Birley 2005, 40, has suggested he was given troops from Syria.
37 Birley 2005, 40.
38 Tac. Ann. 11.20, where it is also claimed that the soldiers of the legions involved wrote a secret despatch to 
Claudius begging that triumphal distinctions be given in advance to all newly-appointed governors responsible 
for legionary troops. 
39 Şahin – Adak 2007, 36-37; Marksteiner - Wörrle 2002, 555-56.
40 Şahin – Adak 2007, 78-79.
41 Compare the situation in Judaea after the death of Herod, where most of his relatives openly preferred to have 
the ‘freedom’ brought by direct Roman rule rather than continued instability over the succession: Jos. AJ 17.9 with 
BJ. 2.6. 
42 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49.
43 Magie 1950, 529. The notion essentially goes back to Dessau 1924, 148-149. For Mauretania and Britannia: see 
below; for Thrace: Bechert 19999, 178; for the [re]annexation of Judaea: see below.
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subject territory (in 44, again ostensibly because of rioting and the death of Roman citi-
zens, although it regained its independence in 53). He also established Moesia as a sepa-
rate province by detaching it from Achaea and Macedonia (in 44/45); and perhaps also 
detached Raetia from Gallia Belgica44. Added to which we might note that in his 13 years 
as princeps, Claudius eventually received 27 imperial salutations, the greatest number 
awarded any princeps, strongly suggestive of an inordinate need and desire on his part for 
military glory45.
There again, the idea that Claudius was desirous of Imperial glory essentially stems not 
just from the number of territories he annexed to create new provinces, but also from what 
is known of his personal circumstances and the nature of his accession. As the grandson 
of one famous military commander, Marc Antony, the son of another, Drusus Claudius 
Nero (also the stepson of Augustus), and the brother of a third, Germanicus, much must 
have been expected of Claudius at the time of his birth. But he suffered a physical afflic-
tion that made him unfit for either public office or military service46, and was doomed 
to a life in the shadows until his nephew, Gaius-Caligula, raised him to the consulship 
in 3747. So, it might be construed that when Fortune eventually smiled on Claudius, with 
his sudden elevation to the rank of princeps after Gaius-Caligula was assassinated on 24th 
January, AD 41, he would avidly take the chance to establish a reputation for himself in a 
like fashion to that of his forebears and his brother. 
More pertinently, it could be better argued that it was essential for Claudius to quickly 
win military glory as a way of confirming and legitimising his position as princeps in the 
eyes of the senate, the people, and especially the army of Rome48. After all, the Praetorian 
Guard had ensured his succession as princeps, so openly certifying for the first time since 
the creation of the principate that the military ultimately held the reins of power49. And as 
luck would have it, Gaius-Caligula’s inept foreign policy had left Claudius with two early 
possibilities to win such military glory. To begin with, there was warfare in Mauretania 
occasioned by Gaius-Caligula’s decision in the winter of 39/40 to summarily execute 
the kingdom’s ruler, Ptolemy, and then provincialise the territory50. Some success in this 
matter was achieved more or less at the same time that Claudius became emperor, so al-
lowing him to accept triumphal honours for the victory51, although further hostilities had 
to be suppressed in 42, following on from which the land was sub-divided to form the 
44 Noricum: Bechert 1999, 181; the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae: Bechert 1999 188; Rhodes: Dio 60.24.4; Moesia: 
Bechert 1999, 171; Raetia: Bechert 1999, 151.
45 Four more than Domitian and six more than Augustus: most of the other principles received less than 12 or so. 
46 Suet. Claud. 3.2, reports that Claudius’ mother allegedly said he was ‘A monster of a man, one not finished but 
merely begun by Mother Nature’. The exact nature of his affliction is uncertain, but cerebral palsy has been 
adduced: e.g., Levick 1990, 13-14 with 200 n. 7: if so it must have been a mild form. 
47 Suet. Claud. 2.1-2, on Claudius being kept out of the public eye as an embarrassment to his family. 
48 Cf. Wells 1984, 120: ‘Claudius … realised how necessary it was for him to acquire military prestige’.
49 On the role of the Praetorian Guard in Claudius accession see Seut. Claud. 10. His debt to them was made 
explicit in the substantial cash grant they received on his accession (see below) and even advertised on his 
coinage (e.g., BMC 5 and RIC 7, showing the Praetorian Camp and Claudius, with the legend IMPER RECEP; BMC 
9 and RIC 12, showing Claudius with a Praetorian signifer (standard bearer) and the legend PRAETOR RECEPT). 
50 Gaius-Caligula’s intention to provincialise Mauretania is indicated by the provincial era beginning in AD 40: cf. 
CIL 8.8360; the process of annexation is fully discussed in Fishwick 1971.
51 Dio 60.8.6; also Suet. Claud. 17.1.
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equestrian provinces of Mauretania Tingitania and Mauretania Caesariensis52. Further mili-
tary glory for Claudius came with the two separate campaigns in Germania in progress at 
the time of his accession, one against the Chatti, the other against the Chauci, these being 
ended in 41, occasioning Claudius’ second imperial salutation53.
Yet while Claudius could claim credit from the way that it was his generals who suc-
cessfully concluded matters in Mauretania and Germany, both campaigns began under 
his predecessor Gaius-Caligula: as such they could hardly be claimed as personal suc-
cesses. But more to the point, the attempted coup d’etat in 42 by L.Arruntius Camillus 
Scribonianus, a distant relative of Pompey, then serving as governor of Dalmatia, brought 
with it the clear need for Claudius to assert his position as commander in chief, one way 
of doing so being by some form of active warfare which would serve to raise the morale 
of the entire Roman army54: and so the decision which must have been made the same 
year to invade Britannia55. 
One justification for the invasion was, or so we are told, that the Britons were ‘caus-
ing trouble because Rome had refused to return certain noble refugees’56, although we 
might concur with Suetonius, that the main reason for the invasion was military glory for 
Claudius himself57: What better way to win such than through capturing a territory that 
the great Caesar had failed to conquer, even if some believed that the cost of adminis-
tering and controlling the territory likely outweighed any potential financial advantages 
through making it subject to taxation58.
So it was that a Roman army commanded by Aulus Plautius landed in Britannia in, 
probably, the May or early June of 4359, and once Roman dominance was asserted over 
the southern part of the island, Claudius himself arrived to formally conclude hostilities 
with the capture of Camulodunum, the de facto British capital. He stayed in Britannia 
for 16 days, during which time he received the submission of various British kings and 
their tribes60, and at least two more imperial salutations, and possibly as many as nine 
in all for the invasion, so bringing the number to the eleven recorded on the Stadiasmus 
Patarensis 61. The senate then voted Claudius the title Britannicus, along with a triumph 
(Claudius becoming the first princeps to celebrate one since 29 BC), and also decreed two 
52 Dio 9.1-6. The territory was certainly sub-divided by 44: cf. ILM 56, with Fishwick 1971, 481-482. 
53 Dio 60.8.7: his first such salutation was the (by now) normal accession salutation.
54 For the revolt of Scribonianus, see Suet. Claud. 13.2, and Dio 60.15.1-3; on the need for conquest as a morale 
booster, see Levick 1990, 139.
55 Cf. Levick 1990, 139, with 196.
56 Suet. Claud 17.1; Dio 60.19.1, adds that the campaign was to restore a refugee British chieftain to his realm.
57 Seut. Claud. 17.1: ‘He made only one campaign and that of little importance. When the senate decreed him the 
ornamenta triumphalia [for the German campaigns], thinking this beneath the imperial dignity and desiring 
the glory of a legitimate triumph, he chose Britain as the best place for acquiring it, for none had attempted 
this since the Deified Julius’: Cf. also Levick 1990, 139; and CIL 6. 40416 = ILS 216, from the triumphal arch at 
Rome commemorating the victory, stating that Claudius was the ‘first to subject to the rule of the Roman people 
barbarian tribes across the Ocean’.
58 Strabo 4.5.3 (200).
59 For the date of the invasion see the discussion in Levick 1990, 141 with n. 15.
60 Suet. Claud. 17.2; Dio, 60.21.1-4, provides a more detailed account (his stay as 16 days at 60.23.1), while CIL 6. 
40416 = ILS 216, states that Claudius personally received the surrender of eleven kings.
61 Cf. Dio.60.21.5. 
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arches to commemorate the capture of Britannia, and that his two-year old son, Tiberius 
Claudius Germanicus, should also be hailed as Britannicus62. 
As already stated, Suetonius emphatically points to the need for military glory as be-
ing the main factor behind Claudius’ invasion of Britannia63. However, it takes a great leap 
of imagination to insinuate from this, as Magie and others have done, that military glory 
was a or even the principal motive for the annexation of all those other free territories that 
Claudius took under the direct control of Rome, namely the Mauretanias, Lycia, Thrace, 
Judaea, Noricum, the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae, and Rhodes (from 44 until 53). Apart from 
the fact that Gaius-Caligula had already decided on the provincialisation of Mauretania, 
we need to remember that all of these territories were of the type usually (and euphemis-
tically) referred to in modern documents as ‘client states’: that is, they had some form of 
treaty relationship with Rome as being among her socii et amici - ‘allies and friends’ - and 
according to the doctrine established by Augustus, they only remained free of direct con-
trol at Rome’s discretion64. 
Generally speaking, such ‘client states’ were annexed only when there was a perceived 
need for direct rule, most commonly when the rulers of those lands we might define as 
‘kingdoms’ proved incapable of maintaining order within their territory; or died with-
out there being an obvious or clearly competent successor. For example, in the year 6, 
Archelaus, ruler of the ethnarchy of Judaea, Samaria and Edom, was deposed to avert a 
potential riot against him for ignoring Mosaic Law by marrying his brother’s widow, his 
realm then being transformed into the Roman province of Judaea as there was no obvious 
acceptable successor65. As it was, in 41, Claudius then reconstituted the province as a king-
dom under the rule of Herod Agrippa, his death in 44 occasioning its re-annexation, ap-
parently because his like-named son, then 17-years old, was considered too young to rule. 
More importantly, however, there is no evidence for any warfare that accompanied or 
was necessitated by Claudius’ transformations in the status of Judaea or of the other ‘client 
states’ he provincialised66. Thus the claims of Magie and others that Lycia and the other 
territories were annexed simply to enhance Claudius’ imperial glory do not withstand 
closer analysis: which leads us to the examination of the third motive alleged for the an-
nexation of Lycia, that it was done to enhance his personal patronage.
To enlarge the scope of his personal patronage? 
S. Jameson, having averred that ‘Die Motive für die Annexion [of Lycia] sind nicht 
ganz klar’, then refers to D. Magie’s claim as discussed above, that Lycia was annexed 
to enhance Claudius’ own imperial glory, before stating that ‘Vielleicht können wir darin 
62 Dio 60.21.1-2.
63 Seut. Claud. 17.1 
64 Cf. Strabo 17.3.25 (840), referring to the ‘client states’ as being under the control of ‘Caesar’ (i.e., Augustus), and 
so territories that were his to manage as he saw fit; also Tac. Ann. 12.45.5, with its reference to the kingdom of 
Armenia being in the gift of ‘the Roman people’.
65 Jos. AJ 17.13.1-2; cf. also Jos. AJ 17.9 with BJ. 2.6.
66 It is true that the occasions or events for which Claudius received his imperial salutations from the nine he held 
in 46 to the 27 in 53 are not entirely clear, but none of them can be associated with the annexation of either 
Lycia, Thrace, Judaea, Noricum, the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae, or Rhodes
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auch ein Streben nach Erweiterung seines Patronats sehen’: in other words, that an ad-
ditional reason for Claudius’ annexation of Lycia was to extend his personal patronage67. 
Unfortunately, Jameson does not explain exactly what she means by this rather enigmatic 
statement, although it can be inferred she had in mind what B. Levick later referred to as 
Claudius’ ‘notorious generosity over granting the citizenship’68. What might be called the 
nub of the matter here is that the grant of citizenship brought with it the obligation of loy-
alty through the patronage-client system, and so the greater the number of people who 
owed their citizenship to Claudius then the greater his popular support in the wider im-
perium. It also brought with it the implicit obligation that those who made the citizenship 
grant should be counted amongst the legatees of those who received it, although Claudius, 
like Augustus and Tiberius, refused bequests from those who had surviving family 
members69. 
Now, it is true that Claudius had a generous and original attitude towards the question 
of who should benefit from receiving Roman citizenship70. But we must remember that 
his reasoning for extending the franchise was to make the best use of provincials in the 
service of the state, and specifically the Senate71. And although several Tiberii Claudii are 
to be found in Lycia, we must also bear in mind that not all men so-named necessarily 
belonged to families enfranchised by Claudius: those so honoured by Tiberius (Claudius 
Nero) before the annexation or by (Tiberius Claudius) Nero after could also have these 
names - apart from which we are told that Claudius did not insist on those he enfran-
chised taking his own nomenclature: and indeed some Lycians who were awarded citi-
zenship under Claudius (and later) chose to take the name of the serving governor at the 
time rather than that of the emperor72. More to the point, very few Lycians seem to have 
made a mark in the imperial service before the end of the 1st century, one exception is M. 
Arruntius Claudianus, the first Lycian to have been adlected to the senatorial order (as is 
proudly reported on a text from Xanthus), perhaps by Domitian but more likely by Trajan: 
but he was more probably descended from a family enfranchised under Augustus rather 
than Claudius73. Indeed, it is not until the early 2nd century that we see the start of a series 
of Lycian Tiberii Claudii entering State Service, and as observed, these need not be mem-
bers of families enfranchised by Claudius74.
It is hard to see, then, how the annexation of Lycia might have resulted from a system-
atic process on the part of Claudius to extend his personal patronage in order to encour-
age those newly enfranchised to enter State service. And so we now turn to the last of 
those alternative motives that have been offered to explain why Lycia was provincialised, 
that financial reasons played their own part in determining such a course of action.
67 Jameson 1973, 278.
68 Levick 1990, 164.
69 Dio.60.6.3.
70 Dio 60.17.5; also Levick 1990, 164-65.It seems that Claudius also instituted the practice of giving Roman 
citizenship to auxiliary veterans after they had honourably served their 25 years or so: Sherwin-White 1973, 247, 
with Birley 1986, 256-57.
71 Tac. Ann. 11.23.24; also Sherwin-White 1973, 238.
72 Dio 60.17.5; note, for example, Q.Veranius Philagrus, named after Quintus Veranius himself.
73 Cf. Devijver 1986, 160 no. 2, with 167.
74 Cf. Syme 1995, 281, with Devijver 1986, 161-162 nos. 5, 6, and 9. The first Lycian to achieve consular status would 
seem to be Ti.Claudius Agrippinus, consul suffectus under Antoninus Pius: Syme 1995, 281. 
129Why did Claudius Annex Lycia?
For financial reasons? 
R. Syme observed that some territories were annexed by Rome for fiscal advantage, 
quoting as one example the territory of Cappadocia (which allowed Tiberius to halve the 
centesima rerum venalium, the 1% sales tax): but he then goes on to confess that to what 
extent a financial motive may have directed the annexation of Lycia ‘baffles conjecture’75. 
True, it is alleged of Gaius-Caligula that already by the end of his first or second year as 
princeps he had squandered the sum of either 2.700, or 2,300 or 3,300 million sesterces 
(HS) allegedly left him by Tiberius76, which might be taken to imply that Claudius would 
quite likely have faced financial difficulties when he assumed the purple. If such were 
indeed the case this might well have encouraged Claudius to follow a path of imperial ex-
pansion through provincialisation as a means of restoring the state of the imperial treasury. 
And yet an analysis of the imperial finances during Claudius’ reign does not at first sight 
support the supposition that he faced any real financial difficulties when he became prin-
ceps77. Indeed, to the contrary. In the first years of his reign he spent large sums of money, 
beginning with the some 880 million HS distributed as the cash handouts a new princeps 
gave on accession to the Praetorian Guard, the Urban Cohorts, the legionaries, and the 
citizens resident in Rome78. While we do not know if this enormous sum was distributed 
in one instalment or in a series of one-off payments, it still accounts to more than a single 
year’s tax-revenue79. Even greater expenditure following with his building programme, 
which included completing the two aqueducts initiated by Gaius-Caligula, building the 
port of Ostia, and the draining of the Fucine Lake80. Added to all this, Claudius is reported 
to have reduced the tax increases introduced by Gaius-Caligula and repealed other new 
taxes that emperor initiated;81 restored property confiscated by the same emperor to the 
original owners or their families; and returned monies confiscated for one or other reason 
by Tiberius and Gaius-Caligula, either to the victims or to their children82. And if that were 
not generous enough, in 41 Claudius went so far as to restore to client status the territories 
of Commagene (with the addition of part of Cilicia), Judaea and Samaria, and the Chalcis83.
75 Syme 1995, 271; on the annexation of Cappadocia and its financial value to Rome, cf. Bennett 2006, 78-81, with 
Tac. Ann. 2.42, for the annexation as a means of halving the tax.
76 Suet. Gai. 37.3, for the allegation, and which gives the first sum; Dio 59.2.6 for the second, the surviving texts 
allowing for either 2,300 or 3,300. But note Burgers 2001, 103-105, where it is speculated that these sums may 
well be exaggerated for effect, while Philo Leg 9 simply refers to Gaius-Caligula as having inherited a fortune. 
77 Levick 1990, 136; Burgers 2001.
78 Depending on the strength of the Praetorian Guard, they alone received between 67.5 and 135 million HS: Levick 
1990, 130 and Burgess 2001, 106.
79 The annual tax revenues and army expenditure of Rome have been calculated at being between 824 million HS, 
with about 54% of this, some 445 million HS going to the army (Hopkins 1980, 120 and 125); and 832 to 983 HS, 
with the army absorbing 72 to 77% of the total (Duncan-Jones 1994, 33-46, with table 3.7).
80 For a comprehensive and fully referenced summary of Claudius’ principal expenditure see Burgers 2001, 105-
106, with 108, where it is estimated that he distributed between 142.5 to 210 million HS during the first years 
of his reign, equal to 17 to 25% of the annual tax revenue. Note, however, that neither Claudius’ road building 
programmes in the European provinces (Levick 1990, 168-173) nor that in Lycia, as reported on the Stadiasmus 
Patarensis, feature in these calculations.
81 But not the tax on prostitution (Dio.59.28.8), still in force in the early 3rd century: SHA Sev.Alex. 24.3.
82 Dio 60.4.1 and 6.3.
83 Cf. Levick 1990, 165-166.
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Although the scale of Claudius’ largesse in the early years of his reign indicates that 
he had money to spare, nonetheless, his extreme generosity in restoring large tracts of 
land formerly under tribute to quasi-independent client rulers must have impacted on 
the Imperial revenues. Consider, for example, what we know of the taxable value of 
Commagene. During the two decades after its annexation in 17, the territory apparently 
returned a total of one billion sesterces in taxes to Rome84, a sum equivalent to 50 million 
per annum, or some 7% of the estimated Imperial revenues - and so enough to pay the 
basic annual stipendium for two legions85. Now it is well known that until the systematic 
taxation reforms of Diocletian the Roman Empire effectively lived on a hand-to-mouth 
basis, receiving enough revenue to pay for what was needed, chiefly the army and any 
military campaigns, with some left over for a relatively small bureaucracy and any neces-
sary State-funded building projects86. What this meant was that any shortfall in revenue or 
increase in expenditure had to made up from somewhere. 
One common way of making a little go a bit further was to lower the precious metal 
content of the imperial coinage and/or to limit the introduction of new coins87, the first 
being a method especially popular in the later principate. And yet analysis of Claudius’ 
coinage shows that not only was some 60% of his gold and silver issues struck between 
the years 41/42 and 51 (24.5% of the total in 51 alone), but that until 51, the denarius at 
least was struck at a slightly higher weight and fineness that was usual under Augustus88. 
To this we might add than in the 14 years he served as princeps, Claudius issued consider-
ably more precious metal coinage than Tiberius and Gaius-Caligula combined over a total 
period of 27 years89. 
If Claudius did not manipulate the coinage to maintain State expenditure at a propor-
tionate level after the loss of Commagene, Judaea-Samaria and the Chalcis - and it is surely 
not unreasonable to assume that the tax revenues from Judaea-Samaria cannot have been 
much less than those from Commagene, although those from tiny Chalcis were perhaps 
negligible -then he must have made up the deficit by other means. Common alternative 
methods for so doing - and ones favoured by Gaius-Caligula - included raising the tax 
burden, imposing new taxes, confiscating land and property on spurious grounds, and the 
sale of imperial lands. But such revenue-raising methods are not attested for the reign of 
Claudius. Quite the opposite: as we have already seen, he lowered the tax increases and 
even cancelled some of the new taxes implemented by Gaius-Caligula, and returned con-
fiscated property and monies to those who had suffered under that emperor and Tiberius. 
It seems, then, that Claudius must have made up the loss in tax revenue through the 
tribute now being paid by the newly annexed territories of Mauretania, Lycia, Thrace 
and Noricum90, although as the Mauretanias, Thrace and Noricum were provided with 
84 Suet. Calig. 16.3.
85 On the basis of each legion having 5,500 men, each man paid in three annual instalments of 400 denarii: cf. 
Speidel 1992, 88, although immunes, centurions and officers would have received a higher rate of pay.
86 Finley 1968, 159.
87 Jones 1974, 190. 
88 Burgers 2001, 100 and 102, with 109.
89 Burgers 2001, 109.
90 Levick 1990, 133. Although the invasion of Britannia may have resulted in a short-term profit from the capture of 
booty and the rapid exploitation of its mineral resources (especially the silver-rich lead of the Mendips, already 
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auxiliary garrisons - a substantial one in the case of the Mauretanias - then some of the 
tribute raised in these provinces must have been diverted to pay for these units. But Lycia 
seems never to have been provided with even a single auxiliary unit, and so the tax re-
turns from that province would have gone direct to Rome: and they may have been quite 
substantial. As it is, the wealth of Lycia was derived from a wide variety of natural resourc-
es and products91. These included, inter alia, sponges, goat hair for ropes, Lycium (a type 
of healing substance), gazelles and panthers for the circus, fish, some of which was appar-
ently processed as garum and/or salsamenta92, and even gilded sandals: but perhaps the 
most valuable commodity of all was its timber, used for ship-building and for furniture. 
Although we cannot even begin to guess the potential tax return to be gained to Rome 
from provincialising Lycia, it must surely have exceeded that of Commagene, a smaller 
area with far fewer natural resources. Indeed, some idea as to the high economic worth of 
Lycia is still to be seen in the many surviving remains that dot the Lycian landscape: but 
it is shown most clearly by the text of an Antonine-period statue base erected at Xanthus, 
(most probably) in honour of Opramoas of Rhodiapolis. This states how the honorand 
distributed a series of benefactions to the koinon and poleis of Lycia totalling 1,300,000 de-
narii, thus 5,200,000 HS 93, a sum equal to one tenth of the probable annual tax revenue of 
Commagene. That one man alone could amass such a disposable fortune is the clearest in-
dictor we have of the economic status of Lycia, admittedly, at least in the Antonine period, 
by when Lycia had enjoyed a century of protection under the Pax Romana. But we cannot 
doubt that in the mid-1st century Lycia was already known to be a territory of substantial 
economic worth94, even if its full potential had not yet been fully exploited. Thus it seems 
quite likely, on balance, that financial reasons played their part in determining the annexa-
tion of Lycia. 
Discussion 
Of the four claimed motives inspiring or resulting in the annexation of Lycia that have 
been examined here, two have been found distinctly wanting. To begin with, there is no 
evidence that the annexation would in any way have enhanced Claudius’ military or impe-
rial glory, as intimated by D. Magie: Lycia was, after all, a subservient and generally peace-
ful client state, and so in any case a nominal if not de facto part of the Roman imperium. 
Nor does it seem that S. Jameson’s idea that Claudius’ programme of extending citizenship 
throughout the Empire as a means of enhancing his personal patronage, and encouraging 
provincials to enter State service, played any part in the decision to assume direct control 
of the territory: few Lycians are known to have entered State service before the time of 
Domitian, and most who did so entered during the 2nd century.
being extracted by 49: CIL 7.1201), it does not seem that Rome expected any great lucre from provincialising the 
territory: cf. the warning of Strabo 4.5.3 (200), on how the cost its direct administration was likely to outweigh 
any potential financial advantages through taxation - as did indeed prove to be the case, Nero considering 
abandoning the island (Suet. Nero 18.1), presumably for such reasons, exacerbated by the Boudiccan revolt of 66.
91 Brandt – Kolb 2005, 100-101, with full references.
92 Zimmermann 2000, esp. 339, where it is estimated that perhaps 400 tons of fish could be processed at Teimusa 
alone on an annual basis.
93 Cf. Brandt – Kolb 2005, 109, with references.
94 Even in Augustan times Lycia was known to be entirely self-sufficient: Ver. Aen. 7.721.
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This leaves us with the two remaining motives, the long-held one that Lycia was an-
nexed simply because of internecine political strife, perhaps leading to a de facto civil war, 
or, as R. Syme speculated, because of the financial benefits the territory brought to Rome. 
As we have seen, the belief that there was civil strife in Lycia in the years preceding its 
annexation cannot be disputed: but it does not follow from this that the resolution of such 
political strife was the reason for Lycia’s annexation - especially as the situation there was 
clearly resolved in a short period of time, allowing Veranius to implement a road-building 
(or rationalisation?) programme completed by 47. The main point is, however, that while 
Rome often intervened to settle matters in her client states, this was not necessarily fol-
lowed by annexation: internal matters in Thrace and Nabataea, for example, resulted in 
Roman intervention on several occasions before these territories were annexed as prov-
inces, Thrace in 44/45, Nabataea in 106/112, in both cases because of the lack of any alter-
native. 
Which leads us to consider if financial motives were involved in the decision to annex 
Lycia. This does seem likely. As we have seen, although Claudius evidently inherited a 
prosperous economy and full treasury when he became princeps, his instantaneous and 
excessive generosity to his soldiers and the Roman people, and the return of Commagene, 
Judaea-Samaria, and the Chalcis to client status, must have placed a severe strain on the 
imperial revenues. His largesse to the military and the people of Rome, for example, if 
paid all at once may have totalled as much as 880 million HS, more than a single year’s 
tax-revenue. Matters would have been made worse by the loss of the territories he re-
turned to client status: it seems likely that Commagene alone may well have contributed 
enough in the way of tribute to maintain two entire legions. When we take into account 
that the negative impact of Rome’s finances brought about by Claudius’ impetuous behav-
iour on accession (no matter his reasons) would be further exacerbated by his planned 
invasion of Britain and his substantial public works programme, along with his lowering 
of the taxes heightened by Gaius-Caligula and the cancellation of others that emperor in-
troduced, it becomes clear that alternative sources of revenue needed to be found - and 
at short notice - to maintain the monies required by the State treasury to fulfil its financial 
obligations. 
As we have seen, one way of balancing the books, so to speak, was to manipulate the 
supply and quality of the coinage, another was by introducing new taxes or raising exist-
ing ones, and yet Claudius took neither of these steps. So, the only real alternative left to 
him was to extend the tax net itself, by incorporating new territories into the imperium 
and so compensate - at least in part - for the loss of those he returned to client status. In 
other words, although a state of ‘discord’ and ‘στάσις’ might have stimulated intervention 
into the affairs of Lycia (and, later, Thrace), we might with reason conclude that the deci-
sion to annex the territory was directed by financial considerations. Indeed, it might even 
be suggested that the decision was taken late in 41 or in 42, when Claudius’ advisers had 
the chance (or courage?) to inform him of the real negative effects on the State treasury 
of his extreme generosity at the time of his accession, and especially so with the return 
of Commagene, Judaea-Samaria and the Chalcis to client status. Thus we might envisage 
a situation in which all that was needed was a reason to intervene into the affairs of a 
generally compliant client state and convert such intervention into longer-term annexation: 
and so the annexation of Lycia.
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Özet
Claudius, Lykia’yı Neden İlhak Etti?
Lykia’nın İ.S. 43 yılında Claudius tarafından ilhak edilmesi hakkında bilgi veren her 
iki antik kaynağımız da olayı bölgedeki iç huzursuzlukla ilintilendirir (Suet. Claud. 25.3: 
discordia; ve Dio 60.17.3: stãsiw). Günümüz bilim adamlarının çoğu bu bilgiyi hiç sına-
madan kabul etmiş ve uzun süredir Roma’nın müttefiki olan Lykia’nın bu ‘iç huzursuzluk’ 
üzerine karar verilerek veya bunun sonucu olarak ilhak edildiğini düşünmüşlerdir. Bu 
yorum, Lykia’nın ilhakını kuşatan koşulları yakın zamanda Stadiasmus Patarensis. Itinera 
Romana Provinciae Lyciae (2007) eserinde irdeleyen S. Şahin ve M. Adak tarafından da 
ulaşılan birincil sonuçtur. Araştırmacıların ulaştığı sonuca göre Lykia’nın ‘Roma’nın mütte-
fiki ve dostu’ statüsünü yitirip sıradan bir eyalet olarak Roma imperiumuna katılmasının 
temel veya asıl sebebinin Lykia’daki ‘huzursuzluk’ durumu olduğu teyit ediliyor.
İmparatorluk Roma’sının, normalde sadık ve barışçıl müttefik bir devleti sırf iç siyasi 
huzursuzluğu var diye ilhak etmeye kalkıştığına dair çok nadiren kanıt görülür. Ki bu du-
rumda, Lykia’yı ilhak etmek için rol oynamış olabilecek diğer motivasyonlara bakmak ge-
rekir. S. Şahin ve M. Adak’ın da yaptığı gibi başka bilim adamlarınca öne sürülen alternatif 
savların temelde göz ardı edildiği Lykia’nın ilhakı konusu için özellikle diğer hususlara 
bakmak gereklidir. Söz konusu alternatif açıklamalara göre Lykia’nın ilhakı en azından kıs-
men Claudius’un şahsi askeri veya imparatorluk şanını iyileştirmek; veya (Roma’da siyasi 
desteği garantilemek için) kendisinin şahsi hamilik alanını genişletmek amacıyla; ya da 
mali sebeplerden dolayı gerçekleştirildi.
Lykia’nın ilhakı için öne sürülen dört motivasyon ayrıntıyla irdelenmiştir. İç huzursuz-
luk her ne kadar Roma’nın Lykia’nın içişlerine karışmasına giden yolu açmış olmasına 
karşın ilhakın bu sebeple yapıldığına dair çok az kanıt vardır. Bu ilhak imparatorluk şa-
nını veya imparatorun hamiliğini artırmak sebeplerinden dolayı kararlaştırılmıştı. Ancak 
Lykia’nın sıradan bir Roma eyaleti yapılmasında mali konular önemli bir rol oynamış 
görünüyor. Bu durum Claudius’un tahta çıktığı İ.S. 41 ve izleyen on yıldaki Roma ekono-
misine bir bakışla ortaya çıkıyor. İ.S. 41 yılında imparatorluk maliyesi açıkça iyi durumda 
olmasına ve Claudius’un orduya ve Roma halkına önemli miktarlarda bağış yapmasını 
sağlamasına karşın aynı sırada Kommagene, Judaea-Samaria ve Khalkis’i tekrar vasal 
konuma döndürmesi imparatorluk gelirlerine önemli bir etki yapmış olmalıdır. Örneğin, 
vergi potansiyeli bağlamında Kommagene’nin ekonomik değeri konusunda kaynağımıza 
güvenecek olursak sadece bu bölgeden gelen vergi gelirleri en azından iki lejyonun yıllık 
ödemelerini karşılıyordu.
Gelirlerdeki bu kayıp imparatorluk bütçesinde bir şekilde tazmin edilmek durumunday-
dı ve Claudius’un imparatorluk döneminin tipik özelliği olan muazzam kamu projelerinin 
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(örn. Roma’da tamamladığı iki yeni su kemeri ve Ostia’daki yeni liman) masraflarını 
da karşılamak üzere yerine daha fazlası konmalıydı. Claudius’un bu kaybı telafi etmek 
için sikke emisyonu veya kalitesinde herhangi bir oynama yaptığı bilinmediğine göre 
mantıken imparatorluk bütçesindeki açığın başka yollarla kapatılmış olması gerekiyor. 
Mauretania’nın ilhakı ve Britannia’nın işgali bu süreçte bir paya sahip olabilir fakat her iki 
bölgeye de konuşlandırılması gereken ordular için kaynağa ihtiyaç vardı. Makalemizde, 
Claudius’un imparatorluğunun ilk yıllarında başka bölgelerle (Thracia, Noricum ve Alpes 
Graiae et Poeninae) birlikte Lykia’nın da Roma imperiumuna ilhak edilmesine kısmen, 
Kommagene, Judaea-Samaria ve Khalkis’in vasallığa döndürülmesi nedeniyle ortaya çıkan 
vergi kaybından dolayı karar verildiği öne sürülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, aşırı bir siyasi durum 
Roma’nın müdahalesine yol açmış olsa bile ilhaka karar verilmesi imparatorluk bütçesini 
dengelemek amacıyla mali endişelerden kaynaklanmıştır.
